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Queens of Hearts: Dorian, Princess Diana, and the Sign of the Authentic 
Daniel Lea1 
Abstract: 
Contemporary culture is caught in a representational bind:  fascinated by - and yet tired of - 
its tendency towards artifice and involution, whilst simultaneously attracted to - and yet 
sceptical of - the idea of the authentic. The hermeneutical confusion brought about by this 
self-identity crisis has given rise to a semiotic indistinction around artificiality and 
authenticity, leaving the observer trapped not by their bipolarity, but caught within their 
layers as they interleave. This essay explores the ramifications of this through an 
examination of the relationship between Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891) 
and Will Self’s Dorian: An Imitation (2002). Identifying the imitative intent of Self’s rewrite as 
problematic, the essay situates the twentieth-century’s shift towards an ethic of private 
authenticity over sincerity as indicative of a significant change in self and social 
understanding. However the demands and desires of late-capitalism have made it 
increasingly difficult to isolate what that authenticity might mean, and what credibility can 
be attached to it. By examining Self’s portrayal of Princess Diana’s life and death, it is argued 
that for all its importance as a signifier of value, contemporary authenticity is hopelessly 
caught within the representational order of the artificial. 
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“At once desperate for authenticity and in love with artifice” is how David Shields describes 
himself at the start of Reality Hunger, his manifesto for the return of the real to twenty-first 
century culture.2 This paradox could comfortably describe much contemporary literary 
fiction in Britain which displays a fondness for narrative self-consciousness underwritten by 
a nagging conviction that such circularity amounts to little more than self-congratulatory 
navel-gazing. In this vein, A.S Byatt’s The Biographer’s Tale (2000) satirizes a bourgeois 
intellectualism that fetishizes the Linguistic revolution as a replacement for the difficult task 
of trying to understand how a human being’s life might impact on how they think and act. In 
the early twenty-first century much of the gloss of postmodernism’s deconstructive practice 
has been worn off by familiarity and not a little contempt, but where that leaves us in terms 
of innovative modes in the arena of fiction is unclear. The recent popularity of the historical 
novel (Sarah Waters, Fingersmith [2002]; Julian Barnes, Arthur and George [2005]; Hilary 
Mantel, Wolf Hall [2009]; David Mitchell, The Thousand Autumns of Jacob de Zoet [2010]), 
may indicate a turn away from formal and intellectual experimentalism and towards the 
safer waters of mainstream historicism, but might also be seen as an abrogation of the 
responsibility of the novelist “to go on to the streets and figure out social reality”.3 
Ironically, novelists, like Byatt herself, schooled in the Byzantine looping and deferrals of 
poststructuralist cultural theory, find themselves somewhat beached by the inescapability 
of their own literary logic, producing a form of what Jim Collins has called “Lit-Lit” for a class 
of educated reader smitten by the cultural capital of the worthy contemporary novel with 
its eyes firmly on the – Booker - prize.4 
                                                          
2
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3
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Will Self is a writer and media personality who both embraces and castigates the 
paradoxes of contemporary culture, and in his novel Dorian: An Imitation (2002) he 
articulates the current crisis of confidence in representation by tackling exactly the longing 
for the authentic amongst the artificial that Shields identifies. By translocating Oscar Wilde’s 
The Picture of Dorian Gray to the late twentieth century, Self reopens a debate about the 
intermingling of art and life that attains new dimensions of complexity in the society of the 
spectacle. Self has often been regarded with a certain degree of scepticism by critics for just 
the kind of wry, critical knowingness that Byatt deprecates, but in Dorian, he offers not only 
a critique of the very cultural recirculation in which he indulges, but also an unpacking of the 
significatory field that surrounds contemporary versions of the authentic. His conclusion is 
that as the authentic, the real, the genuine have reclaimed ground in personal and cultural 
vocabularies in recent decades, so the criteria by which we understand them have shifted 
alarmingly out of reach. The more we desire authenticity, the less we seem to know how to 
attain it.  
Self sets himself a formidable narratological hurdle in identifying his novel as an 
imitation, a challenge that would not have been so demanding had he appended “homage” 
or “pastiche” as a sub-title, or had merely allowed the recognisable resonance of the name 
“Dorian” to signal the artistry of the rewrite. To imitate an artefact involves the copying, or 
the production of a representation, of an original, and though this absolutely chimes with 
Self’s understanding of the reflexive retrospectivism of millennial aesthetic practice, it 
confronts him not only with a number of basic structural limitations, but also with what 
could be described as the problem of imaginative anachronism. Assuming that The Picture 
of Dorian Gray’s story of obsessive narcissism translates comprehensively to its new 
context, Self is still faced with the issue of whether it is possible to translocate Wilde’s 
Queens of Hearts 
structure of feeling to an historical environment of different emphases. Imitation suggests 
sameness, and yet part of the problem with Dorian: An Imitation is that it constructs a 
narrative universe in which the co-ordinates of social belonging, moral responsibility and 
subjective identification are significantly changed. Clearly, the evolution of social attitudes 
towards homosexuality and drug-use are written into the novel as indicators of greater 
moral liberalism and inclusivity, and Self’s desire to articulate that which Wilde could only 
gesture towards underpins the justification for rewriting so closely. However, it will be one 
contention of this essay that Self’s faithfulness to the original text makes plain significant 
divergences between the subjective and social imaginaries of the two periods under review.  
The argument that follows will be based on two interleaving premises: firstly that the 
consonances and dissonances between the Dorian Gray stories produced by Wilde and Self 
reveal a significant shift in the understanding of the “true nature” of the self that has 
occurred over the course of the twentieth century, and, secondly, that the contemporary 
identification of subjectivity with a personal authenticity sits problematically with the  
discourse of post-metaphysical philosophy that situates both self and authenticity as 
abstract signs. In the case of the first premise, Self’s decision to imitate Wilde forces him to 
engage with the imperative of late-nineteenth-century social sincerity, a task tackled in such 
an awkward manner that it demonstrates the degree to which that notion has become alien 
to the contemporary idiom. Instead, Self’s emphasis falls on the experience of the individual 
as monad, as integer and as self-fulfilling beyond the social contract. True, Dorian 
dramatizes the intricate relations between individuals, groups, classes and social sets, and 
does so within a narrative punctuated with the historical landmarks of the late-twentieth 
century, but the way in which his characters understand and express the complexity of their 
subjectivity within the social collective is qualitatively different from that displayed by 
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Wilde’s cast. That different engagement with society and others will be identified in this 
essay with an attitude toward individualism that has dominated Westernized cultures in the 
second half of the twentieth century, and is summed up by Charles Taylor as the “ethic of 
authenticity” broadly defined as “the individualism of disengaged rationality, pioneered by 
Descartes, where the demand is that each person think self-responsibly for him- or 
herself”.5  
The shift in emphasis between Wilde’s concern about social sincerity and Self’s 
understanding of personal authenticity is equally the shift towards a highly technologized, 
globalized, economically mobile, model of social organisation that de-emphasizes the value 
of ethical responsibility for others in favour of individualistic self-enabling. Yet, just as 
sincerity exerts an overbearing moral demand that Wilde detests, so the credo of 
authenticity is fraught with compromises that Self’s characters struggle to accommodate. 
For, as the second premise of this essay suggests, the ostensible relativism and inclusiveness 
of the ethic of authenticity is inextricably related to, and disabled by, the ideology of late-
capitalism with all its bewilderingly inchoate desires. The order to “be yourself” is not 
unproblematic where that self might be variously torn between conflicting politics and 
modes of identity, or where the very notion of subjectivity has been deconstructed. What 
might authenticity mean in the age of the decentered subject, and how can one excavate 
something as formless as a stable self from within the kind of semiotic proliferation that has 
been ushered in by the era of digital communication and mass media? The answers that 
Dorian proffers reveal its distance in spirit from The Picture of Dorian Gray, but also 
emphasize the difficulties of “finding” oneself within the profusion of self-possibilities that 
characterize late-capitalist societies. Like the serpent eating its own tail, contemporary 
                                                          
5
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authenticity depends upon the ingestion of the conceit of authenticity, a circularity that is 
performed most spectacularly in the novel by Diana, Princess of Wales. This essay will 
devote considerable attention to the meta-metaphoricity of Diana, by which I mean the self-
conscious inscription by Self of Diana’s own self-conscious inscription as “Queen of Hearts”, 
wronged wife and self-determining single mother. As an individual and sign, she functions in 
the novel as a mirror for changes in the social fabric of Britain in the last decades of the 
century, and as a catalyst for shifts in the relationship between the private and public 
spheres. And yet her own narrative of self-discovery, so spectacularly played out in, and 
through the media, encapsulates the problem of authentikós – literally the positing of 
oneself as a thesis6 – for the “post-deconstructive subject”.7 Diana’s life and death may have 
inspired calls for greater “emotional authenticity” in millennial public life,8 but for Self, she 
was, and remains, a contested site of authentic self-expression.   
  Authenticity, as it has been conceptualized in the West’s Existentialist philosophical 
tradition, relates to the experience of selfhood as a conscious and ongoing enacting of the 
bridge between interior and exterior constitution. It is predominantly a post-Enlightenment 
phenomenon, consonant with the emergence of modern individualism, and reflects what 
Charles Guignon describes as “the attempt to recover a sense of oneness and wholeness 
that appears to have been lost with the rise of modernity”.9 For Jacob Golomb, it “signifies 
something beyond the domain of objective language” and “defines itself as lacking any 
definition. It is a pathos of incessant change, as opposed to a passive subordination to one 
                                                          
6
 In Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity, Alessandro Ferrara explains: “In Greek 
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“authentic” refers to individuals who “posit themselves” or, more freely, “set themselves as a thesis”” (Ferrara, 
15). 
7
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8
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9
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particular ethic”.10 In Sincerity and Authenticity, Lionel Trilling proposes an interpretation of 
authenticity as “the downward movement through all the cultural superstructures to some 
place where all movement ends, and begins”.11 He additionally claims that authenticity 
requires a “strenuous moral experience … [an] exigent conception of the self and of what 
being true to it consists in, and a less acceptant and genial view of the social circumstances 
of life”. 12 Authenticity may presuppose an ethical exigency, but in the form that it has been 
construed since at least the late-nineteenth century, it does not demand – though may 
include - a specifically moral character. Sincerity, by contrast, is much more stridently 
associated with the good that stems from matching one’s words to one’s convictions. It is 
the “congruence between one’s inclination and the prevailing ethos, or a congruence 
between one’s behaviour and one’s innermost essence”,13 is “a moral and not an aesthetic 
virtue”,14 and is paradoxical as it “cannot thrive in one’s inner self, but must at least on 
occasion be outwardly recognizable. To be sincere is not just to tell the truth about oneself 
willy-nilly, but to present oneself sincerely”.15 By the late-nineteenth century, sincerity had, 
according to Patricia Ball, added to this external face a quality of moral rigour that recast 
sincere expression as “divine manifestation, the voice of nature, and as such it is a “measure 
of worth” and of human stature”: 
 
[the] … equating of good poetic speech with moral practice in the “common talk of daily 
life” is a typical illustration of one reason why sincerity came to attain its high place in 
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Victorian literary estimation: it brought poetry within the safe orbit of the ethic of 
respectability.16  
 
Though the restrictiveness of late-Victorian sincerity is undoubtedly a primary target 
in Wilde’s writing, in The Picture of Dorian Gray, what we see emerging is a dialectical 
opposition between sincerity and a form of authenticity. Declan Kiberd believes that Wilde 
“saw that in being true to a single self, a sincere man may be false to half a dozen other 
selves...If all art must contain the essential criticism of its prevailing codes, for Wilde an 
authentic life must recognize all that is opposed to it”.17 At the centre of the novel is the 
question of how to express the nature of self as it “really” is. This is evident in Basil 
Hallward’s dedication to artistic naturalism, in Dorian’s identification with the portrait and 
subsequent hedonistic self-obliteration, and in Lord Henry’s up-taking of Wilde’s judgement 
that “we are never more true to ourselves than when we are inconsistent”.18 That being 
true to this inner nature is always potentially in conflict with the social or ideological 
paradigms of the historical moment, is at the satirical heart of the novel, as Wilde asks how 
one can be what one is within society if one’s mode of being is distinct from that of the 
hegemonic moral norm. Conformity to an ideal of public conduct in the name of civilization 
smacks of Nietzsche’s Dionysian self’s containment by order and reason, and what, for 
Wilde, is lost  is a primitive vitalism that is not just the well-spring of human spirit, but also 
the site of creativity. In “The Critic as Artist” he writes: “The true critic will … seek for beauty 
in every age and in every school, and will never suffer himself to be limited to any settled 
custom of thought, or stereotyped mode of looking at things.  ... Through constant change, 
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 Ball, 4. 
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and through constant change alone, he will find his true unity”.19 Renouncing the singular in 
favour of the multiple, the conformist in favour of the resistant, and the orderly in favour of 
the chaotic, Wilde celebrates the potential of misrule, convinced that those - such as Basil 
Hallward - who cling to the notion of an integrated public/private identity are doomed by 
their own idealism. He lambasts conspicuous moral rectitude through Lord Henry who 
understands that, in an age of appearances, one can be true to oneself only by being deeply 
insincere. Wotton repeatedly argues against a sincere worldview, provocatively claiming 
that the less sincere an expressed opinion, the more it is likely to be based in truth because 
it is not coloured by social convention, personal taste or moral persuasion. Liberating the 
ego from the exigencies of consistency, and revelling in the way that ostentatiously 
transgressive behaviour appals social decorum, Wotton preaches a credo of self-discovery 
through self-annihilation. Only by acknowledging sincerity as an arbitrary pose, can it be of 
any value, thus his brand of self-conscious moral ambiguity and trans-valuation combine to 
repudiate seriousness and to celebrate paradox. Wotton’s insincerity is thus a playful force 
that liberates a nascent “self-fullness” in a way that strikes a distinctly contemporary chord. 
Yet for all its focus on proliferation and the decentring of the subject, Wilde’s novel elicits a 
faith in the notion of the core selfhood as a trans-temporal underpinning for the individual, 
which supports the idea of the emerging significance of authenticity as a mode of situating 
the subject beyond a moral framework. 
Though the terms “authenticity” or “authentic” never appear in The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, much of its concern with self-representation is tied to a conception of fixed 
and determined interiority that is familiar to a contemporary understanding of authenticity 
                                                          
19
 Ibid., 53. 
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as it applies to the individual.20 There is a foundational belief in an innerness that transcends 
the immediate moment and coheres mind with body, past with present and experience with 
sensation. Moreover it is an inhering essence that reveals itself to the gaze of the world. 
Henry describes Dorian as “unconscious of what you really are, of what you really might be”, 
an indication both of the givenness of authentic being and its provisionality – as soon as he 
declares what Dorian “is” he moderates it to what he “might be”.21 The emphasis here is on 
being and becoming with the repetition of “really” cementing a vision of Dorian as fixed in 
reality but capable of a higher, more authentic state. Despite the seductive intent of Henry’s 
flattery, his words assume a deeply-embedded sense of selfhood, one whose authenticity is 
hidden from view for the subject but perceptible to the observer. Dorian is human clay to be 
moulded into a perfect objective beauty, which, as a consequence, will reveal the truth of 
his soul. However as soon as he is represented, he loses touch of, and control over the 
meaning of himself. Dorian is abstracted from the real of his own subjectivity by Basil’s 
portrait and Wotton’s Pygmalion-esque objectification, and as such, he has no hope of 
attaining his own sense of stable selfhood. He cannot become conscious of his authentic self 
- “who he really is” - unless he gives in to Henrys vision of “what he really might be”.  
It is only when Dorian regards the picture with Henry’s words ringing in his ears that 
he recognizes himself, or rather, recognizes the abstracted self that he has come to 
associate with himself: “A look of joy came into his eyes, as if he had recognised himself for 
the first time”.22  He can only come to a consciousness of himself, in other words, through a 
                                                          
20
 The shaping of a latent authenticity is further elucidated in Wilde’s essays. In “The Soul of Man Under 
Socialism” Wilde argues that great artists and thinkers are “real men” (Wilde, “The Soul of man Under 
Socialism”, 391) because they recognise that self-realisation is the means of perfecting the individual’s 
consciousness. Similarly, in “The Critic as Artist”, “not doing but being, and not being merely, but becoming” 
(Wilde, “The Critic as Artist”, 45) is the ultimate goal of life. Such an emergence of self is achievable only 
through the contemplative life, for “self-culture is the true ideal of man” (Ibid., 47).  
21
 Wilde, Dorian Gray, 25. 
22
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transmutation into an aesthetic object; what he sees and recognizes in himself is the illusion 
of authenticity presented externally. Briefly, and apparently for the first time, Dorian is able 
to harmonize his interior and exterior dimensions, but, given Henry’s interference, the 
insight that he attains will remain compromised - and inauthentic - unless he can claim self-
determination through his actions. These actions become, of course, increasingly 
incongruent with whom he “really” is as he indulges in the pursuit of sensation and 
experience for their own sakes. His enthusiastic leap into decadent experientialism results in 
his adoption of “certain modes of thought that he knew to be really alien to his nature”, and 
it is made clear that his avowal of Henry’s philosophy stems less from a concerted effort of 
self-revelation than from the subtle reframing of morality effected by Wotton.23 The 
rejection of sincere speech and the understanding of interior and exterior dimensions of self 
as morally independent is intended to facilitate Henry’s individualistic project of realising 
“one’s nature perfectly – that is what each of us is here for”, but the higher morality invoked 
by this self-transformation requires the kind of capricious insincerity of which Dorian is only 
temporarily capable.24 Dorian desires the permanent coalescence of outer beauty and inner 
harmony, but is led to believe that only by turning away from any notion of their unity can 
he overcome deleterious conformity, and paradoxically, thereby achieve the authenticity 
that he craves. Renouncing the value of the fixed, the moral, and the acceptable is Henry’s 
way of asserting the irreducibility of the monad, but Dorian’s firm conviction in “what he 
really is” is incompatible with the protean subjectivity required by Wotton’s hedonism. 
Wilde rejects sincerity through deliberate perversity, paradox and inversion because it 
smacks of intellectual conformism, but he simultaneously constructs a version of self that is 
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striving towards an authentic expression, even though that can only be articulated through 
self-parody.  
The Picture of Dorian Gray evidences a shift towards the “darker imperative of 
authenticity” which becomes increasingly dominant across the twentieth century, to the 
point that, when Self recuperates Wilde’s novel, the problem of articulating an authentic 
experience of self eclipses the idea of sincerity as a means of situating the individual.25 The 
late-twentieth-century way to understand the self is not through co-ordination with a 
moral, socially acquiescent sincerity, or even a perverse self-unmasking through insincerity, 
but through an efficient ordering of the self as monad. Contemporary Western imperatives 
– whether political, economic, technological, ideological or philosophical – locate 
individualism as a core ethical value, a form of centripetal reflexivity that Taylor describes as 
“expressivism”.26 This kind of re-orientation of moral agency away from a responsibility to 
the social body or a metaphysical authority, and towards the self and its immediate 
attendants, de-emphasizes sincerity, for a consonance between what one feels privately and 
says publically is increasingly subordinated to the internal consistency of the self as 
individual. To express what one genuinely feels may still be a positive indicator of one’s 
social being,27 but the greater moral value is attached to the contiguity between those 
feelings and the understanding of the self as a rounded, fully psychologized, self-
determining mind/body integer. Dorian consequently inverts the sincerity/authenticity 
model offered by Wilde to suggest that the importance of authenticity in late-capitalism 
overshadows, without completely effacing, the idea of social sincerity. Rather sincerity has 
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 Kiberd. 
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been transformed into a form of sentimentality where saying what one feels is simply a 
matter of self-performance, absent of any moral dimension. This finds its apotheosis in 
Dorian in Tony Blair’s glitzy media-presentation of New Labour, and in the tears that are 
shed so freely at the funeral of Princess Diana. These displays are, for Self, founded on bad 
faith as they do not bridge inner feelings and outer expressions, but rather function as 
clichés of empathic integrity. Whether or not the individuals producing these signs 
wholeheartedly buy into the genuine nature of their expressions is irrelevant because their 
very understanding of the (in)sincere is contained within a dominant episteme of 
authenticity that over-writes its predecessor. 
What we witness then in Self’s recuperation of Wilde is, I would argue, less the 
contiguity between the late-nineteenth and late-twentieth centuries, and more their 
marked differences in public and private imaginaries. As much as Self seeks to convince his 
reader of the parallels between socio-political decadence, moral relativism and aesthetic 
morbidity, Dorian’s problems with imitation suggest his difficulty in marrying Wilde’s world-
view with that of the millennium. The not insignificant changes that Self chooses to make to 
The Picture of Dorian Gray – notably the refocusing of much of the narrative from the 
perspective of Wotton, the trans-gendering of Sibyl Vane into Herman, and the addition of 
an epilogue that frames the main narrative within the view of Dorian – highlight the 
emphasis-shift towards a novel that Wilde could not have written, but they also introduce 
concerns with representation and politics that feel peculiarly detached from the original. 
This opening-out of Wilde’s text to novel readings is not, in itself, problematic, but it does 
trouble the status of the text as an “imitation”, even the kind of imitation that might be 
inferred from its self-ironising intentionality. Indeed, one area in which Self is faithful to 
Wilde – the condemnation of contemporary artistic form by employing the conventions of 
Queens of Hearts 
that form - examples the texts’ disparity rather than their confluence. Where Wilde deploys 
the decadent novel as a Trojan horse for his critics, encouraging their detraction in order to 
reveal the embedded conservatism of their taste, Self attempts a similar sleight-of-hand by 
utilising tropes of the postmodern novel – pastiche, self-reflexivity, ironic framing, critical 
self-awareness, ideological scepticism – to critique the aesthetic exhaustion of 
postmodernism. The problem arises from the fact that postmodernism has always been 
conscious of its own contingency and entropic tendency – it is always already the literature 
of exhaustion. Thus, Self’s attempt to claim a decadent inheritance is overshadowed by the 
decadence that attaches itself to the idea of postmodernity. Where Wilde’s self-parody 
works as a perverse statement of intent, a correction to the hidebound institutionalism of 
his critics, Self’s functions as a deliberately wry instantiation of the form which he mocks. 
The question is whether it is enough merely to draw attention to the circularity of the 
cultural process, particularly if that process is intimately tied up with the knowledge of its 
own circularity. The flaw in Self’s fidelity to Wilde’s deconstructive agenda does not 
invalidate it as a novelistic experiment, but it does suggest that we cannot read Dorian and 
The Picture of Dorian Gray using the same hermeneutic parameters – the texts are not doing 
the same thing.  
Where Wilde’s text dramatizes the confusion of moral and aesthetic value through 
the intellectual badinage of privileged bohemians, Self’s commentary takes a more broad-
based swipe at the social ills of Britain and of the “stinky, inky heart of tentacular London”.28 
The metropolis of the 1980s and 1990s is a site of dysfunction in the public and private 
spheres, the distance between the squalid and the ostentatious as minimal in geographical 
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proximity as it is marked in financial terms. When Baz visits the AIDS-stricken Henry in 
hospital the contiguity is painfully apparent: 
 
Everywhere he went was spick and span and therapeutically colour-coded. The interior 
designers had been summoned when the Royal Fag Hag began to take an interest in the gay 
plague and came to open the Broderip. Yet just inches away from where Baz strode were 
ventilation ducts choking on infective fluff and stagnant puddles of mop wipe, each with its 
own malarial vector.29  
 
In Self’s London poverty, destitution, corruption, and hopelessness are merely a head-turn 
away from the glamour, confidence and prosperity of moneyed respectability. Infective 
vectors unite both worlds, disregarding the cordons sanitaire that social privilege and 
plutocratic muscle seek to establish, drawing all into a form of collective vulnerability. This 
insalubrious inter-reliance is most frankly metaphorized by the “conga-line of buggery” that 
introduces the HIV virus into Dorian’s social set through the infected body of the rent-boy 
Herman. Unsurprisingly a phrase picked up by many of the novel’s reviewers as a nod to the 
sexual explicitness of Dorian, the metaphor operates principally as a compression of high 
and low living that underpins Self’s social interdependence and the mutually destructive 
decadence that refers back to Wilde. For, just as Wilde and the Decadent movement sought 
the collapse of civilization in order that a more vital, ascetic spirit might rise from the ashes, 
so Self details and deprecates a catalogue of ailments that characterizes millennial Britain. 
Rampant social inequality leading to violent unrest; Thatcherism’s political marginalization 
of the welfare state; aesthetic exhaustion and introspection compounded by the 
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commercial sell-out of the avant-garde, philosophical introspection, a mindless celebrity 
culture fed by the insatiability of supply-driven capitalism – all are targets for Self’s satire of 
contemporary entropy. 
 At the dark heart of this manifest decadence are the self-interested politics of neo-
liberal capitalism. Dorian abounds with the ideological imperatives of Reganite/Thatcherite 
free-market individualism that shifts the responsibility for economic and social betterment 
away from the State and onto the citizen, whilst enabling, through deregulation, the thriving 
of a competitive corporate sector. Benefitting the few and favoured, this politics threatens 
to disenfranchize the many by rendering them infantile post-ideologues, fascinated by the 
buzz and bright lights of consumerist possibility, but outwith its self-enhancing structures. 
“How fitting”, Self’s narrator observes “that Ritalin should have become … the drug of 
choice for pacifying those the medico-education establishment deem to have “Attention 
Deficit Disorder”“.30 Calming the hyperactivity of those excluded from the acquisitive party 
allows them “to become healthily fixated by the minutiae of our tiny society, with its toy 
cars and play buildings”, without feeling the need to question the inclusiveness of the 
policies that have brought it into being.31 The hindmost in this free-for-all are taken by the 
devil of charitable patronage, a double-edged welfare lottery that blends grudging 
philanthropy with social climbing. At a function for his mother’s charity, Dorian observes the 
tokenistic nature of this new richesse oblige: 
 
… she led Dorian into the throng of superannuated debs, professional faggots and off-the-
peg suits – a flat company leavened only by a handful of the requisite donkey-jacketed roll-
                                                          
30
 Ibid., 46. 
31
 Ibid., 47. 
Daniel Lea 
 
17 
 
up smokers (just as a charity event for multiple sclerosis sufferers would have its wheel-
chair users, or for sickle-cell anaemia its blacks).32  
 
The crude identity politics of Self’s description here are indicative of the broad-brush 
functionalism of a society that understands its citizens as economic units – as wealth-
makers or drains on the public resource. More importantly, it reminds us that the characters 
in this novel operate as scripted phenomena, representative parts of a tableau that is 
contained within the imitative frame of another novel. The overt correspondences between 
the texts in terms of naming or the tripartite structure constantly bring back to us the 
knowledge that these characters are being over-written, moulded in the same way that 
Dorian is shaped by Wotton. It installs a diegesis that is based, on the one hand, on 
performativity and, on the other, on the Wildean dialectic between art and life. Consider, 
for instance, the cornucopia of competing signs that revolves around the “picture” of 
Dorian: Baz Hallward’s Cathode Narcissus. This piece of conceptual art, consisting of nine 
video screens displaying progressively intimate images of the naked Dorian, becomes a 
conduit not only for the story of Dorian’s moral degradation and infective decadence, but 
also for the historical events that punctuate the narrative. On the installation, Dorian and 
Baz watch the Brixton Riots of April 1981, sipping vodka martinis between vigorous sex 
sessions, as cocktails of a different variety are dispatched at the police: “On screen, on 
carpet, in Brixton, in Battersea, on videotape, in reality, men thrashed and bashed about in 
the violence of abandonment”.33 The erotics of possession and dispossession brought 
together by the medium of the TV monitor, work to elevate the stuff of life to the status of 
art - destruction is figured here as a decadent performance – but also to reduce art to the 
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everyday through the use of the TV set for its primary, broadcasting, rather than artistic, 
function. A similar collision of the banal and the sublime occurs when, at Baz’s vernissage, 
Prince Charles and Princess Diana’s wedding dominates the nine screens. The “expensive 
charades”34 involved in the reinvigoration of the British monarchy sits uncomfortably with 
the stance of bohemian indifference adopted by this In-set, but the important point is that 
Baz’s installation can incorporate and express a variety of significatory functions. Cathode 
Narcissus is simultaneously bleeding-edge conceptual art, a means for mass entertainment, 
a conduit for tradition, and for anti-establishment sentiment, and the vehicle for 
emphasising the semiotic contingency of a world increasingly trapped within the nexus of 
mediated simulacra. As the ever pseudo-intellectual Henry remarks: “Everyone who isn’t a 
pseudo-intellectual loves television – it’s so much realer than reality”.35   
 Cathode Narcissus’s principal function in this blurring of life and art is to detail the 
objectification of the individual in the age of the image, confusing the relationship not just 
between appearance and reality, but also between the multiple ontological shades of that 
appearance/reality dichotomy. Where Basil Hallward’s portrait of Dorian objectifies him 
with the aesthetic purpose of revealing the wholeness and temporal inviolability that lies 
beneath the surface, Baz Hallward’s installation piece fractures Dorian across nine screens, 
dismantling his integrity with an increasingly dehumanising intrusiveness:   
 
The sensation imparted as all nine monitors came to life was of the most intense, 
carnivorous, predatory voyeurism. The youth was like a fleshly bonbon, or titillating titbit, 
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wholly unaware of the ravening mouth of the camera. The ninth monitor displayed only his 
mobile pink mouth.36       
 
This scopophilic deconstruction iterates a quality of the modern subject as fragmented, 
disintegrated and vulnerable to the deindividuating gaze. The self is presented as a pattern 
of contiguous, exteriorized parts that interrelate but lack any kind of internal integrity. In 
contrast to Basil Hallward’s painting which captures Dorian’s interiority as a palpable 
quality, Cathode Narcissus suggests only the impalpability of its subject, its failure to 
transcend its medium to attain an authenticating coalescence. For Self, this is the fate of 
identity in a culture of proliferation. The West’s commitment to efficient, increasingly 
technologized production in many areas of human endeavour during the twentieth century 
has led to a cultural expectation of over-productivity in the consuming mind, and of 
massification in the cultural diffusion of information and entertainment. Television, one 
amongst an increasing plethora of media, enables a democratic engagement with the 
surrounding world, but presents such an abundance of choice that it generates what Jay 
David Bolter and Richard Grusin have described as “the aesthetic of the glance” - the 
conviction that so many competing media interests can only lead to momentary 
attentiveness, and a consequently fragmentary understanding of the world.37 In the domain 
of subjectivity, this excessiveness marks an epistemic shift, for the self can no longer be 
synonymous with its limitation in terms of bodily form, gender expectation, or social 
mobility, but is marked rather by its potentialities for change, expansion, difference, and 
multiplicity. As we see with Cathode Narcissus, the idea of identity becomes synonymous 
with a body in parts, each subject to the glance, but failing to cohere into a solid whole. 
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 The problem, as far as Self is concerned, lies in the fact that the contemporary 
society of the spectacle is incapable of bifurcating the real and the simulacral; instead the 
two are inextricably co-dependent, their credibility and signification mutually determining. 
The “art” of Dorian’s portrait in Wilde is straightforwardly discernible from the “life” of the 
physical presence of Dorian, but in Self, the distinction is not so comfortably a matter of 
mimetic discrimination. Instead Dorian questions whether it is any longer possible to 
distinguish between degrees of realness and degrees of simulation; the interpretative 
distinction is not between the binary poles of stable concepts such as reality and 
appearance, but between their continuously shifting signifying apparatuses. The result is the 
profuse semiotic interplay in operation in Dorian’s relationship with The Picture of Dorian 
Gray, which is neither straightforwardly postmodernist counter-historical rewriting, nor 
post-postmodernist critique of an enervated self-referentiality, but somewhere within the 
interleaving layers of both. The success or failure of the novel – qua novel – may depend on 
the extent to which one regards Self to be in control of the semiotic multiplicities with which 
he is playing. Whether the sheer excessiveness of what he is trying to achieve can be 
contained within a form such as the novel is a moot point, but, to consider the experiment a 
failure in terms of providing an integrated, satisfying and self-consistent reading experience, 
might be to acknowledge the perspicacity of Self’s point: contemporary modes of 
representation and understanding are so inter-reliant that they have become impossible to 
separate. Within this carnival of significatory mayhem, what is needed is a fixing point, a 
point de capiton that can accommodate and stabilize the slipperiness of the signifier across 
a multitude of ontological possibilities.38 This is where what we might think of as the 
mediating function of authenticity can be helpful, for though it seems helplessly 
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anachronistic to conceive an absolute and embodied base amongst this chaos, it is clear that 
the idea of the authentic retains a powerful appeal as a horizon of selfhood, and can pin the 
recalcitrant signifier within a frame of meaning. In Dorian, the possibilities and limitations of 
this version of the authentic are dramatized in the intertwining narratives of Dorian and 
Princess Diana. 
 From early in the novel the two are connected, and though she does not have a 
directly comparable model in The Picture of Dorian Gray, Diana increasingly comes to 
resemble the ill-fated actress Sybil Vane, a role which is also played in the early parts of the 
novel by Herman. The primary narrative and its framing epilogue are bookended by Diana’s 
rise to public attention in 1981 and her untimely death in 1997, a span which is cruelly 
metaphorized in Henry’s contemplation of history as being “savagely concertinaed, like a 
speeding limousine that’s hit a concrete pillar”.39 In many ways she becomes the most 
dominant presence and potent metaphor for contemporary concerns with celebrity, 
individuation and self-determination. Casual references to her abound: Dorian lives in a flat 
in Prince of Wales Mansions in Battersea; one of his housemates in New York is an African-
American transvestite named “Lady Di”; Henry earnestly seeks to avoid her sympathetic 
ministrations on the Broderip Ward, and, as we have seen, significant episodes of her life 
such as her wedding and the 1995 Panorama interview, in which she “came out” against the 
Royal Establishment, are played out on Cathode Narcissus. The paths of Diana and Dorian 
cross at various points and it is clear that we are intended to regard their narratives in 
parallel, and the constructedness of their personae as comparable. Both are forced to 
engage with external versions of themselves over which they have no control, both 
understand their stories through parameters set for them by others and both exemplify the 
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problems of being true to oneself in an age where, regardless of the focus on self-
determination, dividualism, rather than individualism, is a primary constituent of 
subjectivity. 
Self’s opinion of Princess Diana is forthrightly presented in an essay he wrote shortly 
after her death in September 1997: “If Diana stood for anything it was a miserable Oprah 
Winfreyisation of public culture, in which egregious tit-beating came to be synonymous with 
honour and probity”.40 This summation matches in cynicism of spirit that presented by 
Wotton who criticizes Dorian’s association with the Princess:  
 
He’s developed a particular affinity with Thickie Spencer, because like her he’s a 
psychological parvenu. After all, both of them have bona fides aplenty to be themselves in 
the beau monde, yet they prefer to act. They find acting so much more real than reality. … 
he understands how her particular act – her grazed heart crying out for a Band-aid, while 
she shops ‘til every last equerry drops – constitutes the very Zeitgeist itself. Remember, 
Dorian can be whatever you want him to be - a punk or a parvenu, a dodgy geezer or a 
doting courtier, a witty fop or a City yuppy.41 
 
Both critiques damn Diana for her perceived diva-esque manipulation of popular sentiment, 
and for epitomising a culture in which private matters are enacted on a public stage, but as 
Self acknowledges in his essay, the Diana sign far outstrips the incidentals of her conduct: 
“In truth, she’s now more alive than she ever was when breathing; the magnificent elision of 
techno-death and world celebrity has imprisoned her reality, encapsulated it forever”.42 Like 
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Dorian, Diana is the product of a concerted process of imagistic fashioning – she is the sum 
of the innumerable acts of representation that maintain her in the public imaginary. Like 
few before her, Diana lived to feed the fantasy of “Diana” in the context of the 
hypermediated circulation of contemporary culture. Critics - and in the wake of her death, 
particularly feminist critics - have fallen over themselves to identify her with the politics of a 
postmodern technological sublime, emphasising how she was disempowered by her 
simulacral status, torn between the public desire for a figure of sympathetic authority and 
the rigidity of a paternalistic monarchical traditionalism. For them, Diana was the apotheosis 
of the contemporary specular sensibility, a fetish for the culture of image consumption and 
continuous change.43 In an age where the simplification and disambiguation of the 
celebrity’s social meaning is necessary for their continued prominence, Diana problematized 
that dynamic by being fragmented across a range of private fantasies and public wish-
fulfilments. Elizabeth Wilson identifies her multiplicity of roles: 
 
To begin with she was simply the ingénue, the fairy princess, but she rapidly became 
mother, crazy, neurotic, wife betrayed, self-obsessed narcissist, glamour star, woman-
struggling-for-independence, survivor and latterly, saint, strong woman, and even political 
interventionist.44  
 
Donna Cox believes that “The metatext called “Diana” is a text we write and which then 
loops back in a rhetorical feedback situation to masquerade as originary to itself. “Her true 
story” is then no thing but a tissue of telling” [sic], 45 while Rosi Braidotti describes her as 
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“the mediation … for the expression of desires, aspirations and emotions which exceed the 
boundaries of what is allowed in politics”.46  
 The alacrity with which feminist critics appropriated her as a model of contemporary 
female self-statement moving through victimhood to tragedy, indicates the metaphorical 
pliability of the Diana sign.47 She always stands for something rather than simply standing, 
and her co-option by political interests – as much as her fictional one by Self – reveals her as 
a locus of illusory public projections rather than as a self-determining, authentic 
embodiment. In this I would disagree with Jude Davies who believes that Diana went 
through a process of “finding herself” in the gradual shedding of unwanted symbolic 
associations, that effectively she only became “the real Diana” once the boundary between 
person and persona was hopelessly confused.48 Instead, the excessiveness of the Diana sign, 
its multiple political, ideological, racial, cultural and sexual manifestations mean that it is 
impossible to pinpoint her firmly within a symbolic order - whether or not that be, as 
feminist critics contend, a patriarchal order. It is too fluid and inchoate. Rather, her sign 
seems to function as a nexus for interconnected, but distinct, socially symbolic vectors 
which she both embodies and to which she gives meaning. But it is not as simple as that, for 
Diana, as semiotic function, is simultaneously present and absent, a paradoxical sign that is 
both filled with imaginary associations and yet empty of transcendent meaning. For 
instance, she seems to be a regenerative force in a moment of constitutional exhaustion 
and political corruption, she seems equally to be a fixing point in a moment of post-imperial 
social decay, and she seems to be at the empathetic focus for concerns about the 
dismantling of the caring welfare state under neo-liberal economics. At the same time, she 
                                                          
46
 Braidotti. 
47 See in particular: Braidotti; Hey; Showalter, “Storming the Wintry Palace”. 
48
 Davies, 23. 
Daniel Lea 
 
25 
 
seems to represent the potential for an inclusive Britishness for the socially ex-centric -
people of colour, homosexuals, victims everywhere) and she seems to represent a fixing 
point for the gender debates of late century which seek to revivify feminist and leftist anti-
Establishment practices. However, for all the symbolic fecundity of her sign, she eludes all 
specification because she exceeds all those areas; she cannot be determined in terms of any 
specific cause because she is so symbolically polymorphous. The hyperreal construction of 
Diana crosses the frames of all these areas in the same way that Henry Wotton crosses the 
frames of the novel, leaking into other frames of reference. José Yebra provides a useful 
reading of this permeability through the lens of the neo-baroque which “uses the irregular, 
the distorted and the excessive so as to involve the reader aesthetically, emotionally and 
even physically” in the complex interlayering of realities in the text.49  
With the sepulchral voice of Wotton echoing through Dorian’s Epilogue, Self confounds the 
anticipated distinction between primary text and frame and dissolves the boundary that 
separates their hermeneutic domains. Effectively Wotton cannot be contained by his text 
and spills across its border in an excess of malevolent cynicism. The same is true, though in a 
different mood, of Diana, whose metaphorical surplus is too large to be contained by one 
individual. In fact, in writing this essay, it has been difficult to restrict my discussion to the 
relevance of Diana to Self’s text without addressing the extraneous matter of her life and 
death as I perceived it as her contemporary. This could well be a fault of my critical position, 
but it could equally be symptomatic of the suggestive links between art and life that have 
been adumbrated in this essay, and to which none of us are immune in an age of mass 
mediation. This is because Diana is not a self-construction – or a “self-made individual” as 
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Davies calls her50 - but a collective wish-fulfilment, a sliding signifier. In an age of the 
simulacrum this ontological multiplicity is unsurprising and it is undoubtedly one that Diana 
learned to utilize, but it takes on a different valence with her desire – post-divorce and post-
Panorama - to move away from her many faces and speak with only one. Once she does 
this, she moves into a signifying terrain that is determinedly redemptive. Her search for a 
point of self-fixity, of authentic self-determination entails her within a new narrative arc of 
tragedy whose denouement draws comparisons with that of Wilde’s Sibyl Vane. 
In relation to The Picture of Dorian Gray, Rachel Bowlby has argued that once an 
individual enters the order of representation it is futile to think of her/him as having a fixed 
or stable identity. Instead the aestheticized object becomes something more or less than its 
original, “open to any and every kind of verbal or visual portrayal without there being any 
original nature which the picture might be said to misrepresent.” 51 The objectification 
involved in the process of representation disrupts the relationship between the performed 
and any prior authenticity as in the case of Sybil Vane whose beauty derives -at least for 
Dorian) solely from her ability to be other than she is. Sibyl’s ability to transform herself on 
stage, to produce herself as another, results in what she might consider her own authentic 
self being consumed by the process of representing a coherent interiority. Sibyl’s appeal for 
Dorian is exactly this “illusion of a concealed identity”, but she finds an authenticity behind 
the sham, believing that her feelings for Dorian reveal the hollowness of her stage 
performances and the inflated emotions that she enacts.52 Her error is to frame that 
authenticity within another fiction which casts Dorian in the role of Prince Charming. Unlike 
the other main characters who are beguiled by their own cleverness, Sibyl’s ingenuousness 
                                                          
50
 Ibid., 20. 
51
 Bowlby , 179. 
52
 Ibid., 180. 
Daniel Lea 
 
27 
 
blinds her to the intermingling of art and life, and between posture and sincerity, and it is 
ultimately the shattering of that illusion that leads to her suicide – she dies because she 
comes to believe that “she has found a fixed identity beyond her various theatrical parts.”53  
 The parallels with Diana are clear, even down to the illusory desirability of her Prince 
Charming. Like Sibyl, the Diana sign is a product of the roles that she performs and once she 
enters the representational frame, she is transformed into an aesthetic product without the 
ability to direct the reading of herself as an individual. Within the public sphere, her 
authentic selfhood is relevant only as a fiction that intersects with the desires of those that 
create and consume her, and she is trapped within the same dialectic of life/art that 
disempowers Sibyl. Her marriage is understood as a fairy-tale and her divorce, alienation 
from the Royal Family and violent death, are discursive inevitabilities for the tragic heroine. 
For her public she is the epitome of the authentic in her role as the fairy-tale, virgin princess, 
the superstar celebrity, the adoring mother and latterly the independent woman seeking 
validation for her own self. In the early stages of public notoriety her authenticity emerges 
from a complicated dialectical relationship with the monarchy in which she is granted status 
and tradition from her family background and her marriage into the Establishment. In For 
They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor, Slavoj Žižek argues that the 
Royal Family represents a form of non-alienated fullness that commands a charisma that is 
lacking in the rest of us because of our subjection to the social contract.54 As part of the 
Family, Diana is endowed with a form of vicarious authenticity, and yet at the same time, 
her resistance to the practices of the monarchy, and her ex-centric position within it, grant 
her the position of outsider and rebel, and from this rebellion emerges the sense that she is 
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the authentic one and the Royal Family are identified as emotionally sterile and inauthentic. 
In her post-divorce role, she articulates a similar complicated dual symbolism wherein she is 
authentic in the sense that she is “like us”, a woman seeking to make her way in the world, 
and yet, she is fundamentally inauthentic because her lifestyle is nothing like “ours”. So the 
movement towards an authentic form of self-expression on the one hand is matched by a 
deauthenticating movement on the other. Her “authenticity” – as it constructed narratively 
from the outside - is closely tied to a profoundly inauthentic positioning within the social 
imaginary. Thus Diana is at once a symbol of authenticity and inauthenticity and is unable to 
escape its paradox because both are created and sustained by the media and by the image. 
Diana then cannot be isolated as either authentic or inauthentic, she is a constant fusion of 
the two, but in that combination she articulates the difficulty of being - and seen to be being 
- in the age of the simulacrum.  
 Diana’s death brought our current complicated relationship with authenticity 
viscerally into the public sphere, and creates no less of a traumatic rupture in Dorian. The 
primary narrative concludes with Dorian’s suicide and Henry’s death from AIDS, but is 
succeeded by the Epilogue in which it is revealed that the story has been fabricated by 
Henry as an act of revenge against his protégé. Outside Henry’s frame, Dorian is a successful 
entrepreneur in the arts and new media industry, a philanthropist and a member of the 
“Cool Britannia” glitterati – in short, a Blairite parvenu. His social conscience chimes with a 
shift in the mood of the narrative towards optimism and national rebirth: 
 
There was a definite vibe about Britain in the air. It seemed that at long last the world spirit 
of stylishness – so long absent from London – had decided to return. … Street fashion 
synergized with pop music, pop music energized politics, politics draped about its suited 
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shoulders the humanitarian mantle of the Princess, and the cartoon antics of conceptual 
artists galvanized everybody. So what if the whole giddy rondo had an air of the fin de siècle 
about it? Because it was the end of the twentieth century, and after a hundred years of 
willed decline, there was a feeling abroad in the land that things could only get better.55   
 
Deliberately echoing the rhetoric of New Labour politics in the lead-up to the 1997 general 
election - such as in the appropriation of D:Ream’s 1994 pop anthem Things Can Only Get 
Better - this passage appears to be written within the ingenuous style of the moment which 
emphasized the liberation of a reborn national sensibility. If Wotton’s narrative represents 
the decadence of a washed up aestheticism and political cynicism, then that which is 
focalised through Dorian represents the openness of newness and authenticity.56 And 
where, for Henry, Diana is the parasitic representative of an institutional stagnancy, for 
Dorian she is the harbinger of an ethically and socially responsible Establishment:    
 
… she was pushing her personal crusade in the most radical of directions. In January she was 
in Angola clearing landmines with the Halo Trust, and making it absolutely clear that she had 
no intention of allowing royal protocol to get in the way of her humanitarian work, or her 
personal life.57 
 
Diana’s saintly humanitarianism is comparable with the sentimentalisation of the public 
sphere that Self suggests is being offered by Blair and consensus politics at century’s end. 
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Though the tone here is ostensibly guileless, it must be read within the context of historical 
events - the death of Diana and the unravelling of the Blair revolution58 - and within the 
framework of the narrative more broadly. Just as Wotton’s narrative is framed by Dorian’s, 
so Dorian’s is framed by historical events, meaning that the Epilogue should not be read 
with any greater sense of reliability than that which precedes it. New Labour’s use of 
sentimental hyperbole as political rhetoric succeeded partly because of the perceived 
distance between the public and private domains that had been wrought by decreasing 
sympathy with the introspection of an exhausted Tory government, but it succeeded 
principally because it smacked of sincerity. The political charisma that attached itself to Blair 
reflected the same kinds of collective hopes and needs for something meaningful that Diana 
epitomized, but like her, he was also caught within a similar hyperreal distancing from 
anything solid.  
Dorian’s Epilogue is set around the events following Diana’s death in August 1997, a 
moment of both crisis and opportunity for the new political administration, and a moment 
to test the profundity of the mood swing towards authenticity in public life. For all the 
mythological resonances that Elaine Showalter and Rosi Briadotti – among many other 
critics - might want to read into Diana’s death, its inevitability is summed up for Self by a 
nominal irony: “She had to die … because her name was Di.”59 The simplicity of this self-
fulfilling prophecy points us once again to the colonisation of the Diana sign by a ravenous 
and voyeuristic public driven by a media cult of personality. Diana is understood not as a 
psychologically complex individual but as a series of messages and collectively shared 
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narratives whose trajectories and conclusions are commonly understood. Diana has to die 
because the narrative of the oppressed woman tragically deprived of a life of self-
determination seemingly at the moment of attaining it demands it. Equally she has to die 
because the mother of the heir to the throne could not be seen to be consorting with an 
Egyptian Muslim, or she has to die because she was too beautiful/saintly/angelic to live, or 
because, like James Dean or Marilyn Monroe, the flicker of talent is easily burnt out. Self’s 
point is that however polyvalent the Diana sign, it is pre-inscribed within culture not within 
the individual herself. Diana’s death is her ultimate performance and the ideal opportunity 
for those who have consumed her to become part of her narrative and their fantasy of 
belonging, wholeness and authenticity. Dorian ends near the floral tributes outside 
Kensington Palace, more excessive and unrestrained signification that was to be inflated still 
further by the scenes of mourning on the day of Diana’s funeral.60 For Thomas de Zengotita 
this grief was both genuine and performative:   
Di’s mourners were truly grieving and they were performing. Immersed in a world 
continuously represented from every angle, they understood Di’s death as an opportunity to 
play a significant role in it, to represent themselves at levels of prominence usually reserved 
for the celebrated. But they already knew how to be representational.61  
This immersion in mediation has profound implications for the understanding of 
authenticity that I have been putting forward in this essay for it implies that, just as there is 
no longer any distinguishable distance between the simulacrum and the real, so there is no 
longer a clear line between the authentic and the inauthentic. As de Zengotita points out, 
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the pain of Diana’s mourners was genuine and sincere in the sense that it emerged from a 
deep-seated empathetic identification with its object, and coincided with personal stories of 
loss, sadness, incompletion or loneliness. But at the same time, however heartfelt, the grief 
had what Julian Barnes called a “look-at-me” quality about it that suggests either a self-
conscious willingness to be part of a public event, or an unself-conscious confusion of the 
interaction between public and private spheres.62 It is this latter explanation that manifests 
in Wotton’s acerbic whisper: “this is one of those public events that confirms that history is 
nothing more than the confused wet dream of a humanity yoked to its own adolescent 
erotic fantasies.”63 Whether this blurring of self and other is compatible with an idea of 
monadic authenticity is debatable, but certainly within the philosophical tradition of 
existential authenticity its reliance on the validation of the social would discredit it. However 
the idea of the authentic that emerges through Dorian should not perhaps be judged as 
following within this tradition for its predicate is not the stable, centralized ego, but the 
fractured, incoherent postmodern subject. For this subject the distinction between being 
and becoming is hopelessly confused as is the difference between sincere speech and 
performative mimicry.  
Without a blueprint for what the authentic might resemble, it might be argued that 
the term itself becomes anachronistic and an insupportable metaphor for contemporary 
being. To dismiss authenticity as an outdated metanarrative of self would, however, be to 
ignore its potency as a fantasy of delimitation and completion in a culture of increasingly 
globalized surplus, excess and capitalist proliferation. The excessiveness of the postmodern 
sign necessitates a counterbalancing regimen of order and boundary-setting to familiarize 
the sublime within the order of private selfhood. Diana’s search for an authentic voice 
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functions for Self as a fixing point for public fears of incomprehensible profusion and as an 
exemplary contemporary narrative of the difficulties of self-coherence. Yet it is flawed 
because of her failure to recognize that authenticity can no longer be isolated from 
inauthenticity, just as life can no longer be isolated from art. Diana’s attempt to 
authenticate herself involves the shucking off of a charismatic skin of Establishment 
privilege that protects her, and the embracing of an, albeit inflated, ordinariness. But this 
process seeks to deny her status as a construction of the media, of the economy of celebrity 
and of public fantasy. Diana as such does not exist, she is only the performance and so the 
attempt to be authentic becomes nothing more than another performance. Like Sibyl Vane, 
Diana begins to believe in herself as more than her performances and, once she does this, is 
equally doomed. She has to die because she does not exist outside the sign of Di. Self’s point 
is that authenticity in the millennial period can only be negotiated successfully through the 
recognition of the foundational inauthenticity of signs. Believing in the fixity and meaning of 
anything within a culture of mass communication is fruitless, but believing in the perverse 
authenticity of inauthenticity is possible. It is a suitably Wildean paradox and is comparable 
with the conviction in The Picture of Dorian Gray that the only way to be sincere is to be as 
insincere as possible. Embracing the flux of signs and recognising their instability as their 
potentially liberating aspect emerges from Self’s rewrite as the only successful means of 
situating oneself in a climate of decadent excess. Yet the tenacious durability of the idea of 
the fixed authentic in contemporary culture reveals its continuing relevance, just as the 
mourning that went with Diana’s death, in all its over-performativity, was more a mourning 
for the idea of something fixed, something meaningful and something authentic than it was 
for an actual person. 
 
Queens of Hearts 
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